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THE "IN COMMERCE" REQUIREMENTS OF CLAYTON § 7
I. Introduction
There is substantial agreement among the Congress, courts, antitrust en-
forcement authorities, and commentators' that mergers pose significant antitrust
problems and, therefore, that § 7 of the Clayton Act,2 the principal statutory
prohibition against anticompetitive mergers, should be vigorously enforced. How-
ever, two recent Supreme Court decisions which significantly limited the juris-
dictional scope of § 7 have correspondingly reduced the effectiveness of
§ 7's impact on mergers. Starting with Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co.,' the
Court held that a federal court does not have jurisdiction under § 2(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act4 merely because a company's intrastate activities affect
interstate commerce. Then in United States v. America Building Maintenance
Industries,5 the Court extended the jurisdictional standard articulated in Copp
Paving to Clayton § 7; a merger is now subject to § 7 scrutiny only when both
the acquired and acquiring firm are engaged in interstate commerce.
The Court based both decisions on a literal interpretation of the "in com-
merce" language of § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act and § 7 of the Clayton
Act. However, an examination of the Court's decisions in light of the intended
scope of Clayton § 7 indicates that the Court is merely continuing an antitrust
policy popular with the Court's "new antitrust majority."' This is a policy which
is initially tolerant of mergers and subjects the Government's arguments to close
scrutiny.
To assess the effect of this new limitation on federal antitrust law, it is
necessary to determine whether the Court's interpretation is consistent with the
underlying intent of § 7. Moreover, the practical ramification of these decisions
must be explored and analyzed in the context of economic considerations.
II. The Purpose of the Clayton Act
Relying on its decision in Copp Paving, the Supreme Court in American
Building narrowly construed the "in commerce" language of § 7 of the Clayton
Act.' This reasoning is arguably contrary to the underlying purposes of § 7,
especially Congress' initial intent in enacting the entire Clayton Act. The Clay-
ton Act was entitled as "an act to supplement existing laws against unlawful
restraints and monopolies,"' indicating that Congress apparently intended to
remedy the weakness of the Sherman Act. To understand the underlying intent
of § 7, then, it is necessary to discuss the failure of the Sherman Act.
1 See A.B.A. ANTITRUST LAW DEv. 64-105 (1975).
2 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
3 419 U.S. 186 (1974).
4 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
5 95 S. Ct. 2150 (1975).
6 United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 642 (1974).
7 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
8 Ch. 323, 63 Stat. 730. See Levy, The Clayton Law-An Imperfect Supplement to the
Sherman Law, 3 VA. L. Rnv. 411 (1916).
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A. The Inadequacy of the Sherman Act
A major inadequacy of the Sherman Act is its restricted substantive reach.
The Act applies only to conduct actually anticompetitive in effect; it cannot
reach conduct that is potentially anticompetitive.9 Thus, a proposed merger
violates § 2 of the Sherman Acte' only when the merging parties initially have
such a substantial share of the market that indicates an intent to "combine(d)
or conspire(d) with any other person or persons to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several states."1" Section 2 does not reach com-
binations which merely threaten to increase what may eventually become a dan-
gerous level of market power if wielded by one firm. 2
An obvious dilemma arises. On the one hand, if a combination is not sub-
ject to judicial scrutiny until it has amassed such a large share of the market
to be deemed a monopoly under § 2, it may be difficult to fashion an effective
remedy at that point. On the other hand, firms which fall short of possessing a
monopoly may still pose significant anticompetitive effects. Preventing monop-
olies does not adequately redress all antitrust problems.'
The language of § 7 reveals Congress' attempt to avoid this inherent limi-
tation in the Sherman Act. It is apparent that in enacting the Clayton Act Con-
gress effected a significant expansion of the antitrust law by reaching practices
having only a potential anticompetitive effect.
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire . . . the whole or any
part of the assets of another corporation also engaged in commerce, where
in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create
a monopoly.'
9 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 444 (1920).
10 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
11 Id.
12 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 505-06 (1948) (Attorney General
determined that an increase to 32.7 percent of the national total of ingots and to 39 or 51
percent within the Pacific area would not violate the statute); United States v. International
Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927) (64 percent held insufficient); United States v. United
States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920) (50 percent held insufficient). In United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945), Judge Learned Hand articulated
the following standards: (1) a market share in excess of 90 percent would certainly violate
§ 2; (2) a market share between 60 and 64 percent might violate § 2; and (3) a share of
33 percent would not violate § 2.
13 The Supreme Court's adoption of a "rule of reason" approach to the Sherman Act
further emasculated its effectiveness. Under this approach, although the statute proscribed
every contract in restraint of trade, only those practices which the Court deemed unreasonable
were condemned. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). To a large extent § 7 was enacted in reaction
to this judicial approach. This discontent with the rule of reason was expressed in the 1912
National Platform of the Democratic Party: "We regret that the Sherman Anti-Trust Law
has received a judicial construction depriving it of much of its efficiency, and we favor the
enactment of legislation which will restore to the statute the strength of which it has been
deprived by such interpretation." Levy, supra note 8, at 415.
14 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970) (emphasis added). The present language derives from the
Celler-Kefauver Amendment of 1950. This does not alter the foregoing analysis, however,
since although the substantive criteria of § 7 were strengthened in 1950, the original jurisdic-
tional language of § 7 was retained.
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The primary goal of § 2 of the Sherman Act, the prevention of monopoliza-
tion and its reach, is limited to conduct which actually restrains commerce. The
approach of the Clayton Act is: somewhat different: it seeks to promote com-
petition"5 by reaching incipient threats to competition."
B. The Celler-Kelauver Amendment
Two changes effected by the 1950 amendment of § 7 of Clayton further
reflect an intended expansion of coverage.'" First, the Celler-Kefauver Amend-
ment deleted from the language of § 7 the "acquiring-acquired" test.'" Under
this test, a combination violated § 7 when any competition was foreclosed be-
cause of a merger. This construction prohibited only horizontal mergers, because
by definition only these mergers eliminate competition between the merging par-
ties. Because the deletion of the "acquiring-acquired" test from the language of
§ 7 avoids an automatic result, the amended § 7 reflects a recognition by Con-
gress that not every horizontal merger ought to be proscribed." Thus, this dele-
tion restricted to a certain extent the substantive reach of § 7. However, by
deleting the "acquiring-acquired" test, Congress also expanded the scope of the
Clayton Act by prohibiting not only horizontal mergers but also conglomerate
and vertical mergers.?' The amended § 7 was thus accorded a clear expansion
of scope; it now reaches all types of mergers which effect economically significant
consolidations.
The second significant change effected by the Celler-Kefauver amendment
was the deletion of the word "community" from the original language of the
statute.2 ' The legislative history indicates a clear intent on the part of the
drafters that the amended § 7 reach only economically significant combinations.
They feared that if "community" was retained, § 7 might be used to condemn
15 D. MARTIN, MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON ACT 34 (1959).
16 This expansion was given judicial effect in United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957), where the Court noted that the Clayton Act was designed
to reach combinations which might threaten competition. See also Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 311-23 (1962).
17 For the legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver Amendment, see MARTiN, supra note
15, at 221; 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 4293-300; Note, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A
Legislative History, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 766 (1952).
18 The original § 7 read in pertinent part:
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation engaged
also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen
competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation
making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section or community,
or tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce.
Act of October 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731-732 (emphasis added).
19 "While on the one hand it was desired that the test be more inclusive and stricter than
that of the Sherman Act, on the other hand it was not desired that the bill go to the extreme
of prohibiting all acquisitions between competing companies." 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. SERv.
at 4296. In effecting this congressional purpose, the courts have on occasion recognized that
the merger of two relatively small fims might ultimately promote rather than retard com-
petition if the combination of two relatively ineffective competitors results in the creation of
a more viable competitor. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319 (1962).
20 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317 & n.31 (1962).
21 Originally § 7 read: "to create a monopoly of any line of trade in any section or
community." See note 18 supra.
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a merger between two local and economically insignificant firms. 22 That the
word "community" provoked such debate indicates that Congress had no doubt
that § 7 as originally enacted did encompass mergers between essentially local
firms if such mergers produced anticompetitive effects. 3 The deletion of "com-
munity" does not evidence an attempt to place local mergers entirely beyond
the reach of the amended § 7; if this had been Congress' intent, the "any section
of the country" language would not have been retained. Rather, the deletion
of "community" indicates that, while Congress wanted to include local mergers
within the reach of § 7, the effect of such mergers should nevertheless be gauged
to an economically significant "section of the country." This again illustrates an
intent to reach conduct which would fall short of a Sherman Act violation. The
effect of the expansion is not negated by the insistence that such conduct be
economically significant.
The intent of Congress seems clear. The Sherman Act, as drafted, was in-
capable of remedying significant problems of increasing concentration. 4 The
changes in language, the introduction of a less stringent standard of legality, and
the deletion of the term "community" were designed to remedy the shortcomings
of the original antitrust law.
C. The Dilemma: Congress' Intent Is Not Reflected in the Language of § 7
While the intent of § 7 may seem clear from the legislative history, the lan-
guage of § 7 is not equally clear. If Congress designed the Clayton Act to supple-
ment the Sherman Act, in at least one significant respect it did not reflect this
intention in the statute. As the Supreme Court stressed in Copp Paving,25 there
is a crucial difference in the jurisdictional language of the two statutes. The
jurisdictional language of the Sherman Act is very broad; § 1 of the Act pro-
scribes "every contract.., in restraint of trade."2 Indeed, the courts have held
that a federal court has jurisdiction to reach the merits in a Sherman Act case if
the firm is either actually engaged in commerce or if its activities, though locally
22 "The use of this word raised a storm of controversy, centering around the possibility
that the act, so worded, might go so far as to prevent any local enterprise in a small town
from buying up another local enterprise in the same town." 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV.
at 4296.
23 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 23, Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co.,
419 U.S. 186 (1974), reprinted in 8 LAw RIPRINTS, TRADa REGS. SER. No. 1, at 215 (1974-
75 Term).
24 Testifying before the congressional committee drafting the amended § 7, Federal Trade
Commissioner Robert E. Freer stated:
The facts of record demonstrate that our economy has been evolving in a manner
that increasingly contradicts the economic foundations of our institutions and the
basic assumptions of our anti-trust laws. This bill affords an appropriate opportunity
to [take] the first step toward changing our law to cope with the changing facts and not
letting our law against mergers of competing corporations fall further and further
behind while concentration of economic power proceeds further...
Quoted in MARTiN, supra note 15, at 228.
25 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974).
26 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) (emphasis added).
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based, substantially affect interstate commerce." By contrast, the Clayton Act
only prohibits mergers between corporations "engaged in commerce."2
The language of § 7 is clearly less expansive, but until the American Build-
ing" decision there were no cases suggesting that this difference was significant.
There is no indication in the legislative history that the draftsmen either in 1914
or in 1950 deliberately selected such language to limit § 7's proscription to con-
duct actually occurring in interstate commerce. Indeed, that Congress deleted
"community" from the original language of § 7 while retaining "the section
of the country" language seems to indicate a clear intent that § 7 reach the
conduct of essentially local companies, at least to the extent such regulation is
within the constitutional power of Congress."0 Furthermore, when § 1 of the
Clayton Act defines "commerce," it uses language substantially similar not only
to the language used in the Sherman Acte' but also to the commerce clause 2
("trade or commerce among the several states and with foreign nations..."),"
indicating that Congress in enacting the Clayton Act intended to exercise its
full power under the Constitution. Therefore, when it used the phrase "engaged
in commerce" it did not intend to limit the scope of § 7 to preclude the regu-
lation of essentially local activities which substantially affect interstate com-
merce.3
4
Any interpretation faithful to this discernible congressional intent, then,
should not artificially limit the scope of § 7 as the Supreme Court has apparently
done. By scrutinizing American Building and its reliance on Copp Paving more
closely, the extent to which the Court has frustrated the underlying purpose of
the Clayton Act becomes apparent.
27 However, this distinction should be noted: Unless the proscribed conduct falls within
one of the per se categories, the court can have jurisdiction only if it is shown that the effect
on interstate commerce is substantial. Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967); United States v.
Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342
U.S. 143 (1951); United States v. Women's Sportswear Manufacturers Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460
(1949); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal 'Sugar (Go., 334 U.S. 219 (1948);
United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945).
28 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
29 United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 95 S. Ct. 2150 (1975).
30 See text accompanying note 23 supra.
31 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
32 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
33 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970).
34 Why the drafters chose the phrase "engaged in commerce" is not dear. However, the
history behind the adoption of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.O. § 13(a) (1970), is per-
haps elucidating. There the phrase "in or affecting commerce" was specifically rejected; it
has been suggested that this was done because it was anticipated that if such language was
adopted this section would be deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Although there
is no similar rejection of the affecting language in the history of § 7, similar considerations
might have persuaded Congress not to change this language in 1950. Salomon, The Robinson-
Patman Act "Commerce" Requirement: The Emasculation of Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread,
8 U.S.F.L. Rev. 497, 503 (1974).
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III. The Court's Decisions
A. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co.
In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co.,"5 the operator of a plant which
manufactured asphalt concrete used to surface highways sued a liquid producer
of asphalt and two of its subsidiaries under the Sherman, Clayton, and Robin-
son-Patman Acts. The defendant's subsidiaries also produced asphaltic concrete,
in direct competition with plaintiff. Plaintiffs manufacturing and retailing
activities were confined to California. Because concrete weighs a great deal but
has a relatively low value and must be quickly laid, the District Court for the
Northern District of California concluded that the market for asphalt was neces-
sarily local." The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits of
the Sherman Act claims, because the plaintiff had neither established that he
was "in commerce" nor that his activities substantially affected interstate com-
merce."' Whether plaintiff had satisfied the "in commerce" requirements of
§ 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman38 and §§ 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act " was
not discussed. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding
that the plaintiff had satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of the Sherman
Act. Because asphaltic concrete is used in the construction of interstate highways,
the Court of Appeals held that anyone who participated in its production can, as
a matter of law, be deemed an instrumentality of interstate commerce, and thus
"in commerce." ' The Ninth Circuit further reasoned that since the Clayton
Act was designed to supplement the Sherman Act, the "in commerce" require-
ments of all three acts ought to be uniformly interpreted.41
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that the jurisdic-
tional requirements of § 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman Act were not satisfied.
42
The Court rejected the argument that since interstate highways are instrumen-
talities of interstate commerce, anyone engaged in the production of materials
necessary for their construction is as a matter of law "engaged in commerce!"
within the meaning of § 2 (a)." The Court concluded that § 2 (a) applies only
where the alleged price discrimination resulted from a sale which actually crossed
state lines; the "in commerce" requirement was not satisfied by a mere showing
that such discrimination substantially affects interstate commerce.4 The Court
did not decide whether jurisdiction would have been available over the Clayton
§§ 3 and 7 allegations had the plaintiff demonstrated that its activities sub-
stantially affected interstate commerce.4 5
35 In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 1972 Trade Cas. 1 74,013 (N.D. Cal. 1972),
rev'd, 487 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1973), revd sub nom. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419
U.s. 186 (1974).
36 In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 1972 Trade Cas. at 92,207.
37 Id. at 92,208.
38 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
39 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18 (1970).
40 In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 202, 204 (9th Cir. 1973).
41 Id. at 206.
42 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 199 (1974).
43 Id. at 198.
44 Id. at 199-200.
45 Id. at 202.
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The Supreme Court's approach to § 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman Act in
Copp was not entirely without precedent. Courts have held that there is no
jurisdiction under § 2 (a) unless at least one of the allegedly discriminatory
sales actually crossed state lines. 6 There is also, however, contrary authority.
For example, in Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co.." the Supreme Court reversed
the Tenth Circuit's findings that the plaintiff had not satisfied the "in commerce"
requirements of § 2 (a). There the plaintiff sold bread locally but the defendant
operated bakeries in several states. The Court reversed because the defendant
did deliver bread across the New Mexico border into Texas and thus fell within
the literal requirement of the statute. However, there is language in Justice
Douglas' opinion for the majority which suggests that the Court's decision in
Moore has a broader rationale: local discrimination will fall within the statute
whenever such discrimination has been underwritten with the proceeds from
interstate commerce."8 The majority in Copp distinguished Moore on the ground
that the Court there was essentially concerned with commerce power, and not
with jurisdiction.49 Because the inquiry in Copp was essentially jurisdictional,
the Court was deciding whether Congress proscribed the conduct in question.
By contrast, the concern in Moore was whether Congress had the requisite con-
stitutional power under the commerce clause"0 to regulate this activity.
The legislative history of § 2 (a) provides admittedly inconclusive support
for the Court's approach in Copp. In deciding to exclude the "affect on com-
merce" theory as a basis for jurisdiction, the Court noted that Congress specifi-
cally rejected language which would have broadened the "in commerce" require-
ments of § 2(a)."' The Court was not swayed by the argument that Congress
deleted the phrase "whether in commerce or not"52 more in reaction to the
Schechter53 case, which had limited federal power under the commerce clause,
than because of a conscious decision to exercise less than its constitutional power
and thus limit the scope of § 2 (a) to nonlocal instances of price discrimination."'
Rather, the Court narrowly construed the "in commerce" language of § 2(a)
because it considered its legislative history to be at best ambiguous and therefore
not sufficient justification for departing from the approach followed by the courts
since its enactment.5
46 Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972);
Hiram Walker Inc. v. A.S. Tropical, Inc., 407 F.2d 4 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901
(1969).
47 348 U.S. 115 (1954).
48 Id. at 119.
49 419 U.S. at 200 n.17.
50 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
51 419 U.S. at 200.
52 Id. at 199-201.
53 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
54 The 'Conference Committee, however, deleted this "effects on commerce" provision,
leaving only the "in commerce" language of 2(a). Whether Congress took this action
because it wanted to reach only price discrimination or because of its then under-
standing of the reach of the commerce power, its action strongly militates against a
judgment that Congress intended a result it expressly declined to enact.
419 U.S. at 200.
55 419 U.S. at 200.
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B. United States v. American Building Maintenance Industries
In Copp Paving, the Supreme Court did not decide whether the jurisdic-
tional requirements of Clayton § 7 were satisfied by a showing that the conduct
in question had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. United States v.
American Building Maintenance Industries56 provided the Court an opportunity
to resolve this question.
The Government there brought a civil antitrust action against ABMI, one
of the largest suppliers of janitorial services in the country, charging that an
acquisition of a competing janitorial service violated § 7 of the Clayton Act.
At the time of suit ABMI had 56 branches throughout the country serving over
500 communities in the United States and Canada. 7 In southern California,
ABMI held approximately 10 percent of the market for janitorial services. The
challenged action was the acquisition of the Benton Companies, two janitorial
service firms operating exclusively in southern California which together occupied
seven percent of that market.5 Although the Benton Companies operated only
in California, many of their customers were engaged in interstate commerce.
Indeed, contracts with such companies as Mobil Oil, Rockwell International,
and Teledyne accounted for more than 80 percent of their revenues. The
Benton Companies purchased none of their equipment or supplies outside Cali-
fornia, but they obtained some of their supplies through a wholesaler who had
purchased them in interstate commerce.
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that the "in commerce" language
of Clayton § 7 did not reach all activities subject to federal commerce power,"
and that there would be no jurisdiction to consider the merits of a §, 7 merger
question unless both the acquiring and acquired firms were actually engaged in
commerce. 1 The fact that a combination affected interstate commerce was held
insufficient to give the court jurisdiction.62 The Court's decision thus renders the
scope of the Clayton Act less expansive than that of the Sherman Act.63
The Government argued that even if Copp Paving's interpretation of "com-
merce" applied to Clayton § 7, the Court nevertheless had jurisdiction to reach
the merits because the acquiring and acquired firms were "engaged in com-
merce."64 ABMI was clearly engaged in interstate commerce, since it operated
service offices throughout the country. The more crucial question, however, was
whether the activities of the Benton Companies were sufficient to place them in
interstate commerce.6 5 The Court held that since they did not sell or purchase
56 95 S. Ct. 2150 (1975).
57 Id. at 2153.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 2158 n. 9.
60 Id. at 2157-58.
61 Id. at 2154.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 2155.
64 Brief for Appellant at 36, United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 95
S. Ct. 2150 (1975), reprinted in 8 LAw REPRINTS, TRAnY REGs. SER. No. 7, at 112 (1974-
75 Term).
65 The contention of plaintiffs in both American Building and Copp Paving that they
"engaged in commerce" is not entirely unsupportable. Cases decided under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1970), have held that maintenance men, window
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goods or services directly in interstate commerce, the "engaged in commerce" re-
quirement of § 7 had not been satisfied. 6 That the acquired firms purchased sup-
plies from and provided janitorial services to firms clearly engaged in interstate
commerce was held insufficient to meet the "in commerce" requirements of the
statute.
In holding that the § 7 "in commerce" requirements are not sat-
isfied by showing that the combination affects commerce, the Court confined
itself to examining the language of § 7 in the context of its legislative history. The
Court contrasted Clayton § 7 with Sherman § 1 and thought it significant that
the latter proscribed "every contract" while the former only applied to corporate
acquisitions. The Court felt that this difference in language mandated a stricter
construction of the "in commerce" language because it indicated that the scope
of § 7 was less expansive than that of the Sherman Act. In the Court's view,
this difference in language was more persuasive than the argument that Congress
did not intend to limit the jurisdictional scope of a statute designed to bolster
existing antitrust legislation.6" In characterizing the "in commerce" language of
the Clayton Act as distinct,68 the Court concluded that nothing justified its ex-
pansion. 9
Although the Court's opinion in American Building turns almost exclusively
on statutory construction, the Court did not directly address the policy implica-
tions of its decision. The Court intimated that it perceived no policy considera-
tions which favor a different interpretation of the literal language of § 7. Thus,
the Court did not intend to require any change in the Justice Department's en-
forcement policies.70 The Court noted that it has never been the policy of the
Justice Department to attack intrastate mergers and that its decision is thus con-
washers, and workmen repairing interstate highways were "engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce." Alstate Constr. Co. v. Durkin, 345 U.S. 13 (1953);
Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327 U.S. 173 (1946); Borden Co. v. Borella,
325 U.S. 679 (1944); Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125 (1943); Kirschbaum v.
Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942). Admittedly this language differs from the "in commerce"
language of the Clayton Act. However, these cases should still be persuasive in that they
create almost a per se classification, anyone who is "engaged in commerce or in the production
of goods for commerce" is covered by the Act. Such is clearly not the case with Clayton § 7
where the Government must subsequently prove that the acquisition "may substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly." Justice Douglas, dissenting in Copp Paving and
American Building, was persuaded that these cases were grounds for holding that these plain-
tiffs "engaged in commerce." United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 95 S. Ct.
2150, 2159 (1975); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 208 (1974).
66 95 S. Ct. 2150, 2158 (1975).
67 Id. at 2155.
68 Id. at 2154.
69 Although this was the first case to define the "in commerce" language of Clayton § 7,
the Court found support for its position in cases interpreting analogously constructed antitrust
provisions, particularly FTC v. Bunte Bros. Inc., 321 U.S. 349 (1941). There the Court
held that there was jurisdiction to hear a claim brought under § 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970), only if the alleged violation occurred in interstate
commerce. The Court thought that if jurisdiction was extended to conduct which affected
interstate commerce, this would encroach upon areas of local concern and as such greatly
expand the meaning of § 5. The Court was unwilling to take this step without more explicit
instructions from Congress. The "in commerce" language of § 5 has recently been amended
to read "in or affecting commerce" to transcend the jurisdictional limits imposed by Bunte
Bros. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L.
No. 93-637, § 201, 88 Stat. 2193.
70 95 S. Ct. at 2157 n. 8.
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sistent with the remedial aims of § 7.71 The Court concluded, then, that although
the language of § 7 cannot be construed to afford the Court jurisdiction by a
showing of substantial affect on interstate commerce, this construction does not
render the statute incapable of effecting its initial objective.
IV. The Significance of American Building
A. The Framework
American Building interpreted, as did Copp Paving, the meaning of the
phrase "engaged in commerce." The Court resolved this issue by literally inter-
preting the statutory language of § 7. In interpreting statutes, it is the Court's72
duty to look to the literal language of the statute and, if its interpretation of the
language frustrates the law's original design, it is the Legislature's duty to remedy
the situation. After characterizing the initial design of the Clayton Act and
examining the Court's analysis in Copp Paving and American Building, a crucial
question remains unanswered: To what extent has the Court frustrated the
initial design of the Clayton Act § 7? 73
B. The Practical Impact of American Building
In analyzing the practical impact of the Court's approach, it is crucial to
determine what type of mergers are likely to be immune from § 7 scrutiny after
American Building. There is some authority in the Court's opinion for the propo-
sition that the jurisdictional requirements of § 7 will be satisfied if any transaction
of the company has actually occurred in interstate commerce. Thus, in a foot-
note4 the Court indicated that it would not consider the merger condemned in
Von's Grocery7' to be exempt from the operation of Clayton § 7. There, the
Court found that a merger between two Los Angeles grocery store chains violated
§ 7. The suggestion that a merger between two local grocery chains would afford
the court jurisdiction clearly indicates that only those concerns which have never
engaged in interstate commerce would be exempt from the operation of § 7.
71 Id. at 2157. "In sum, neither the legislative history nor the remedial purpose of § 7
of the Clayton Act, as amended and re-enacted in 1950, supports an expansion of § 7 beyond
that defined by its express language." Id.
72 United States v. Wiltberger, 23 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820).
73 As necessary background to the discussion below, both Copp Paving and American
Building were discussed. However, of the two cases, American Building effects the more sig-
nificant legal development because it is the first case to delineate the jurisdictional language
of § 7. Until American Building, only one case had attempted to define the "in commerce"
language of § 7; in Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953), the court defined § 7 "commerce" to include banking. But even
apart from this, American Building is more significant than Copp Paving because, although
there is little local sanction against either mergers or price discrimination, the latter is dearly
more susceptible to local regulation. Price discrimination clearly injures competition at the
local level, whereas the anticompetitive effects of even an essentially intrastate merger will
usually be experienced nationwide.
74 95 S. Ct. at 2157 n.8.
75 United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
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1. Exemption of Service Industries from § 7
As a practical matter, the American Building rule may be limited to those
entrepreneurial pursuits which require neither complicated equipment nor
massive supplies. Logically, the more components necessary to construct the
marketable product, the greater the likelihood that the producer will be forced to
go outside the state to obtain them. Thus, a prime candidate for exemption from
the operation of § 7 would seem to be service industries, which are generally
locally oriented and do not have to look outside the state for either product
components or distributional services.
If the impact of American Building is limited to the service industry,"
it would nevertheless be significant. The Government attacked the American
Building merger both because of the rapid growth which the service industry is
currently experiencing and the appearance of an increasing trend towards con-
centration within that industry.7 7 In its brief, American Building argued that the
Government's attack on its merger was unwarranted because of the low barriers
to entry in the building maintenance industry, and because an increase in the
concentration of that industry did not pose significant antitrust problems."8 Even
if this analysis is accurate, it does not dispose of the issue. The fact that this
particular industry poses none of the problems which the Clayton Act was
initially designed to cure does not guarantee that difficulties will not exist in other
similarly exempted service industries." Thus, American Building allows mergers
to go substantially unchecked in a growing sector of the economy and will facil-
itate the creation of a highly concentrated sector, causing the significant antitrust
problems which § 7 was designed to remedy.
2. A Percentage Test as a Viable Alternative
It is not unequivocally clear that the impact of American Building will in
fact be limited to service industries. The reference in the Court's opinion to
Von's Grocery is somewhat ambiguous. The Court appears to have distinguished
Von's Grocery on the ground that the "District Court ... expressly found that
76 Apart from service industries and other pursuits requiring few inputs, industries partic-
ularly favored by local conditions are, as a practical matter, likely to fall outside the scope
of § 7.
77 It is true that previous Section 7 cases have involved both acquiring and acquired
firms engaged in the flow of commerce. But that past enforcement pattern simply
reflects the fact that the government has devoted its limited enforcement resources
to areas where the need was most pressing. The rapid growth of the service sector
of the national economy is of relatively recent origin and this case is a response
to what the record shows is an increasing trend toward concentration in that sector.
Brief for Appellant at 36, United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 95 S. Ct.
2150 (1975), reprinted in 8 LAw REPRINTS: TRADE RaG. Sar. 112 (No. 7, 1974-75 Term).
78 Id. at 41-52, reprinted in 8 LAw REPRINTS: TRADE RIos. SER, at 169.
79 That a firm is locally oriented and requires few components does not preclude the
emergence of barriers to entry. It is true that a locally based service industry is unlikely to
enjoy economies of scale, as such pursuits are often by definition labor-intensive, rather than
capital- or equipment-intensive. However, some barriers to entry may arise in a locally oriented
firm. For example, the local firm may reap the benefits of advertising to the extent a loyal
following of customers is established; and it may enjoy cost advantages by virtue of the fact
that it was there first. Such advantages deter entry as effectively as do economies of scale.
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both of the merging grocery chains directly participated in the flow of interstate
commerce because each purchased more than 51% of its supplies outside of
California.""0 A question is raised whether this reference indicates that meeting
the jurisdictional requirements of § 7 will become a matter of percentages,
whereby a federal court will have jurisdiction only if a certain percentage of the
company's transactions actually occurred in the course of interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court has previously applied such criteria in deciding whether a
merger violated § 7.81
If this approach is followed, American Building will certainly exempt a large
number of mergers from the operation of § 7. Under this numerical standard, a
nationally based firm could acquire firms in a number of states so long as each
of the acquired firms purchased only 49 percent of its supplies in the course of
interstate commerce. Whether a national firm would be permitted to gain con-
trol of these local markets would ultimately depend upon the portion of supplies
which each acquired firm purchased in interstate commerce. This result is with-
out a rational basis. Whether a national firm can acquire a local firm ought to
depend upon the effect that the acquisition or series of acquisitions has on
competition within that particular industry; it should not depend upon some-
thing as tenuously related to the legislative objective of the antitrust laws as the
percentage of goods actually purchased in interstate commerce. Since these
acquisitions, while not resulting in a monopoly, may enhance the control which
one firm exercises over the market the Court has indirectly sanctioned what
Congress intended to prohibit by the Clayton Act.82
Finally, there is the distinct possibility that the rule announced in American
Building will encourage the creation of its own class of exemptions. It seems likely
that immunizing intrastate firms will reward, if not promote, vertical integration.
A merger with a firm that does not purchase its supplies or sell its products in
interstate commerce is apparently immune from the operation of Clayton § 7
after American Building."
V. Alternatives to Clayton § 7
American Building severely restricts the jurisdictional scope of § 7. Those
mergers now exempt from § 7 scrutiny may pose significant antitrust problems
80 95 S. Ct. at 2157 n.8.
81 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
82 In this context, Representative Heinz made the following comment:
As the law stands now, there is nothing to prevent a national company from merging
with 50 separate companies that are involved only in intrastate commerce. This
could create a situation whereby one large business firm controls the market for its
product in every state of the Union.
BNA ANTrr~uST & TRADF REG. REP. A-15 (1975) (No. 729).
83 The practical significance of American Building is even more notable if it is remem-
bered that both of the merging parties must satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of Clayton
§ 7. In this context, the Court noted:
Under the explicit reach of § 7, therefore, not only must the acquiring corporation
be "engaged in commerce," but this corporation or corporations whose stock or
assets are acquired must be "also engaged in commerce."
95 S. Ct. at 2154. Thus, as was the case in American Building, even if one of the merging
parties is among the largest in the industry, as long as the other is not actually engaged in
interstate commerce the Court has no power under § 7 to prevent a merger between them.
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which the Clayton Act was initially designed to remedy. To effectively limit
those mergers, alternatives to § 7 must be considered. Two alternatives arguably
reach mergers outside the scope of § 7: § 2 of the Sherman Act, 4 which forbids
monopolization and attempts to monopolize, and § 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, which proscribes "unfair methods of competition in commerce, and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce." 5
A. § 2 of the Sherman Act
There are several problems in attacking a merger under § 2 of the Sherman
Act. As noted above, § 2 is limited to the proscription of actual monopolization or
attempted monopolization. Thus, a corporation must possess a large share of the
market before it is subject to attack under § 2.86 By definition, a merger involv-
ing locally oriented firms is unlikely to amass a market share sufficiently large to
come within the substantive reach of § 2. Even where a national firm gains
control of various local markets through a series of acquisitions, a successful § 2
attack would be unlikely unless the control exercised by that firm was fairly
pervasive nationwide. To come within § 2, that national firm would have to
control the local market either in a majority of states or in one well-defined
region of the country. Similarly, a merger between the largest firms within one
state would be virtually free from § 2 scrutiny, except to the extent that such a
merger effected a consolidation with such a significant share of the market that it
posed a nationally significant antitrust problem.
Since a § 2 violation can be established only if the merging parties have
amassed a substantial share of the market, § 2 cannot serve as a viable means of
reaching the majority of mergers which American Building has placed outside
the scope of § 7 of the Clayton Act. A few mergers involving intrastate corpora-
tions may amass sufficient market power to come with the substantive reach of §
2. However, even in these cases there are additional difficulties. To prove that
one has monopolized or has attempted to monopolize, it is crucial that "monop-
oly" be precisely defined.8 7 Such conceptual precision is not essential where it
need only be demonstrated that the effect of a merger tends to create a monopoly.
Additionally, it must be proved that the violation has in fact occurred. Monopoly
is an economic rather than legal concept.8 Proof of monopolization is often
very costly and because a § 2 case turns substantially on factual determinations,
a decision is characteristically considered applicable only to those parties directly
involved in the litigation.88 Therefore, if the Government resorts to § 2 to deal
with those mergers it cannot reach under § 7, it must attack every merger that
84 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
85 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
86 See note 12 supra.
87 It is no longer entirely clear what constitutes a "monopoly." Oligopoly and "shared
monopoly" theories complicate the concept, and render enforcement under Sherman § 2 more
difficult. See Baker, Section 2 Enforcement-The View from the Trench, 41 ABA ANTTRUST
L.J. 613 (1972); Ward, A Current Perspective on Enforcement of Laws Against Monopoliza-
tion, 41 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 601 (1972).
88 Bodner, Monopolization and Attempts to Monopolize: Whatever Happened to Section
2?, 41 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 589, 592 (1972).
89 Baker, supra note 87, at 613-14.
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poses an antitrust question!' since, given the complexity of proving a § 2 viola-
tion, a successful decree in one case is unlikely to deter similarly situated corpo-
rations." The Justice Department lacks the manpower to effectively enforce the
law under these conditions. Moreover, because it is so difficult to prove a § 2
violation, only the most blatant are likely to be attacked under that section. It is
very unlikely, then, that many of the mergers exempted from the operation of
§ 7 by American Building can be, or will be, attacked under § 2."
B. § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
If those mergers exempted from the operation of § 7 after American Build-
ing cannot be reached under § 2 of the Sherman Act, § 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act?' is the remaining alternative. In American Building,4 the
Supreme Court alluded to without exploring the possibility that the American
Building-Benton Companies merger might come within the operation of § 5.
That section prohibits unfair methods of competition and deceptive practices.
As the Court noted, § 5 has recently been amended to read "in or affecting com-
merce."9" Thus, under § 5 a federal court would have jurisdiction over intra-
state commerce if its activities therefrom substantially affect interstate commerce.
A more substantial question is whether the substantive scope of § 5 is broad
enough to encompass mergers. Although its language is very broad, § 5 contains
no express prohibition of mergers. In FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,9 the
Supreme Court held that the substantive reach of § 5 is not confined by the literal
language of the antitrust laws and that practices not proscribed by these laws may
nevertheless be reached under § 5. Presumably this means that a merger which
90 "This is genuine case-by-case enforcement. It has a very low pay-off beyond the four
comers of each case." Id. at 614.
91 Panel Discussion: Monopolization and Attempts to Monopolize: Whatever Happened
to Section 2? 41 ABA ANTrrRuST L.J. 645 (1972). Baker made following remarks:
I think that section 2 enforcement is an enormously difficult area. It really differs
from merger enforcement in practical effect. When we bring a merger case .. . we
are not earning our return in that product market; we are earning a return across
the board-in the credibility of the enforcement process.
Id. at 649.
92 [We really have to be able to justify the enforcement costs of a Section 2
structure case out of the gains in that industry alone: this can be done in a giant
growing industry like computers, but it is not likely in a highly localized monopoly
situation.... It makes sense to try a local merger case and carry it to the Supreme
Court-because the rule we thus established can be applied to anticompetitive mer-
gers in a thousand other Philllpsburgs across the country. This is the vital pay-off
on our efforts. No such pay-off would occur from a monopolization case in the
same market. Similarly situated defendants elsewhere will just sit tight and hope
that lightning won't strike twice.
Baker, supra note 87, at 614.
93 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
94 95 S. Ct. at 2156 n.7.
95 Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No.
93-637, § 201, 88 Stat. 2193.
96 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
97 Thus, legislative and judicial authorities alike convince us that the Federal Trade
Commission does not allocate excessive power to itself if, in measuring a practice
against the elusive, but congressionally mandated standard of fairness, it, like a court
of equity, considers public values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or




for some reason cannot be reached under § 7 might be subject to attack under
§ 5. However, this poses a conceptual problem: Since the Clayton Act was
originally designed to reach incipient Sherman Act violations, allowing § 5 to
encompass situations which fall short of Clayton Act violations is tantamount to
proscribing incipient incipiencies.9 s There are some obvious objections to such
an approach. Principally, it allows the FTC to assume a legislative function,
thus rendering the law in this area largely unpredictable. The greater danger
is that, the substantive language of § 5 being so broad, a court will be able to
decide a case without giving proper consideration to all of the economic ramifica-
tions of the situation.99 Antitrust law applicable to mergers may deteriorate into
a set of overly simplistic rules, devoid of economic reality. To some extent this
has already happened in many merger cases brought under § 7.1"' The use of
§ 5 in such a context can only hasten this trend of disposing of merger questions
without considering whether they conflict with antitrust policy.
It has been suggested that these difficulties can be avoided in jurisdiction-
ally deficient cases brought under § 5 if the substantive standards of the Clayton
Act are implemented.'' Thus, mergers after American Building which fall
outside the scope of § 7 solely because the court lacks jurisdiction might be
attacked under § 5, but the merger could be condemned only if the effect of
the merger was substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.
In such a case, it is clear that the Commission would have to make the same
factual and analytical determinations that a court would have made if the
same merger had been attacked under § 7.
Even if employing the substantive tests of § 7 in a jurisdictionally deficient
case brought under § 5 solves these problems, it is not clear that those mergers
immune from § 7 scrutiny after American Building can be brought within the
reach of § 5. Although there is some indication0 2 that a merger with an intra-
state firm or between two intrastate firms might be condemned under § 5, the
courts have never decided such a case. There is the further problem that the
newly amended § 5 might be subject to constitutional attack:0 . If the "in or
98 Howrey, Utilization by the FTC of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act as
an Antitrust Law, 5 ANTITRUST BULL. 161, 173 (1960); Rahl, Does Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Extend the Clayton Act?, 5 ANTITRUST BULL. 533, 541 (1960).
99 Reeves, Toward a Coherent Antitrust Policy: The Role of Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act in Price Discrimination Regulation, 16 B.C. IND. & Coss. L. REv.
151, 168 (1975).
100 Note, for example, the approach taken by the Court in United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). There, whether a merger violated § 7 turned solely on the
size of the market share amassed; the competitive effects of the merger were not assessed. Only
if the firm has a large share of the market is such an approach warranted.
101 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NAT'L COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS
148-9 (1959); Oppenheim, Guides to Harmonizing Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act with the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 59 MicH. L. REv. 821, 851-52 (1961);
Reeves, supra note 99, at 170-71.
102 95 S. Ct. at 2156 n.7.
103 It should be remembered that in American Building and Copp Paving the Court was
faced with only the jurisdictional issue; its only concern was whether in enacting § 2(a) of
the Robinson-Patman Act and § 7 of the Clayton Act Congress intended to reach the activities
of intrastate firms. Whether Congress can constitutionally regulate such activities is a com-
pletely different question. The Sherman Act was enacted pursuant to the commerce clause,
and only reaches activities which affect interstate commerce. As the Court has insisted, the
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affecting commerce" language is struck down as beyond Congress' constitutional
power under the commerce clause, the jurisdictional scope of § 5 will be no
broader than that of § 7.
If the resort to either § 2 of the Sherman Act or § 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act proves impossible, the restricted jurisdictional scope articulated
in American Building may produce additional problems in merger enforcement
even as to those cases which can still be brought under § 7. In order for the
Government to obtain a favorable decree in a merger case, it must necessarily
argue for a narrow definition of the relevant product and geographic markets."4
Unless the relevant market is narrowly defined, the Government will be unable
to prove that the merger substantially lessens competition or tends to create a
monopoly in that market. After American Building, the Government may have
to broadly define the relevant market in order to claim that a defendant is
actually "engaged in commerce" and thus establish jurisdiction. But once the
market is so defined, the Government's chance of prevailing on the merits will be
substantially diminished.
VI. A Proposal
In deciding American Building the Court did more than determine that the
particular Benton Companies-American Building merger did not violate § 7 of
the Clayton Act. As a practical matter, this decision means that certain types of
mergers will be exempted from the operation of § 7; those mergers which are
exempted may pose significant antitrust problems. For the most part, those
mergers exempted from § 7 scrutiny after American Building will not fall within
the reach of § 2 of the Sherman Act. Although § 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act may provide an effective means of reaching these mergers, there are
a number of unresolved problems with applying it to any merger. Mergers which
fall outside the scope of § 7 after American Building, then, are largely immune
from the operation of any existing antitrust law. Legislative alternatives appear
to be the only recourse.
In reaction to the Copp Paving and American Building decisions, a number
of bills have been proposed in Congress. On March 21, 1975, Senators
Hart and Scott introduced a bill "to improve and facilitate the effective enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws.... "10 5 The proposed bill envisioned the insertion of
the phrase "in or affecting commerce" into the language of §,§ 2(a), 3, and 7
of the Clayton Act."06 This language clearly responds to Copp Paving. The
Hart-Scott Antitrust Improvements Act of 1975,"'7 as the bill was named, was
language of the Clayton Act is different. However, it has not intimated that expanding the
jurisdictional scope of the Clayton Act would render it unconstitutional. Indeed, § 5 might
be more susceptible to constitutional attack because its substantive standard is less precise
than that of § 7.
104 Heflebower, Corporate Mergers: Policy and Economic Analysis, 77 Q.J. EcoN. 537,
545 (1963), reprinted in 1 J. oF REPRINTS FOR ANiTrmruST L. & ECON. 3, 11 (1969).
105 S. 1284, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975).




completely redrafted and was reintroduced in July."" The amended bill provides
for an expansion of the jurisdictional scope of § 7. If this bill is adopted, § 7 will
encompass those situations excluded by American Building: the "in commerce"
language would read: "where the activities of either corporation are in or affect
commerce.""°9 A comparable bill was introduced in the House by the Republican
Task Force on Antitrust and Regulatory Reform.10 One of the cosponsors of this
bill commented on the need for legislative reform:
These two court decisions make it imperative that Congress clarify for the
courts that mergers between corporations and companies that do business
in only one state should fall subject to the antitrust laws."1'
All of these bills envision an expansion of the jurisdictional scope of § 7.
It is clear that the substantive target of § 7 does not pose insurmountable obstacles
to this expansion. Although the Clayton Act clearly effects a less precise standard
of illegality than the Sherman Act, since it prohibits practices which may sub-
stantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly, it was not argued
in either Copp Paving or American Building that because the substantive reach
of §§ 2(a) and 7 is less precise than that of the Sherman Act, the jurisdictional
scope of these statutes ought to be limited accordingly."' Such a limitation would
be unnecessary, for it was not argued that § 7 was or should have been (or that
any comparable provision should be) designed to outlaw all mergers. Although
Congress sought to reach mergers which did not amass sufficient market power
to fall within the proscriptions of § 2 of the Sherman Act, it intended to forbid
only those mergers likely to produce anticompetitive effects. Thus, the substantive
criteria of § 7-that a merger substantially "lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly"-would seem to sufficiently limit the scope of the statute. In
redefining the jurisdictional boundaries of the Clayton Act, or in redrafting
merger legislation which seeks to prohibit conduct short of a monopoly, its broad
substantive reach ought not concern Congress.
In redefining the jurisdictional scope of § 7 to reach local mergers, the only
concern should be that an extension of the statute's scope not be judicially
deemed unconstitutional on the grounds that Congress lacks the authority to
regulate local mergers. Neither Copp Paving nor American Building suggests
that Congress lacks the requisite constitutional power to regulate such conduct.
Rather, the opinions state that, whatever Congress' initial intent, the language
108 July 28, 1975. The Supreme Court handed down its decision in American Building on
June 24, 1975.
109 S. 1284, § 701(b), 94th Cong., 1st Sess., (1975) (emphasis added). Section 701(a) of
the same bill proposes that the "in commerce" language of § 3 of the Clayton Act and § 2(a)
of the Robinson-Patman Act be amended to read "in or affecting commerce."
110 H.R. 9329, cited in BNA ANTrrRuST & TRADn REG. REP. A-14 (Sept. 9, 1975) (No.
729).
111 Id. at A-15.
112 Such an argument was made in Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321, 322-24 (9th Cir. 1974),
where the Ninth Circuit refused to permit the FTC to order restitutionary relief where there
was a violation of § 5, since such broad remedial powers would be inconsistent with the overall
purpose of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
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of §§ 2(a) and 7 clearly indicates that Congress did not exercise its full constitu-
tional power in enacting these statutes. Moreover, both opinions contrast the
language of §§ 2(a) and 7 with that of the Sherman Act. This suggests that
the jurisdictional scope of the Sherman Act, whereby local conduct which affects
interstate commerce is reached, is not constitutionally invalid.
Thus, it is clear that if Congress desires to expand the jurisdictional scope
of the Clayton Act it can do so by enacting one of the proposed bills.
However, it is not clear that the proposed amendments to the jurisdictional
language of the Clayton Act will remedy the problems created by the Court's
approach in American Building. These problems will be eliminated by the pro-
posed legislation only to the extent that this decision merely articulates a drafting
weakness of § 7. These decisions, however, may point to a problem more signif-
icant than a drafting weakness. Recently, a new antitrust majority has emerged
on the Court; it generally subjects the Government's arguments in merger cases
to harsher scrutiny. If these decisions portend something more than a drafting
weakness in § 7, it is clear that a rewording of the "in commerce" language of
§ 7 will not completely eliminate the problems produced by these two decisions.
The phrase "in or affect commerce" is broad enough that it offers the Court
a certain amount of flexibility: in applying this language to particular situations
the Court may construe such language so narrowly that the conduct of local firms
is rarely deemed sufficient to "affect" commerce."18 Thus, even if the Hart-Scott
Bill is adopted, a merger involving a local firm may be effectively exempted from
the federal antitrust laws.
If this approach is taken by the Court, a more extensive approach to the
anticompetitive conduct of local firms will be required of the Legislature. Such
an approach may require a change in both the substantive and jurisdictional
language of the Clayton Act.
S. Lee Martin
113 See note 65 supra.
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